



#29 RESEARCH SEMINAR IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Department of Economics
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1220
SEMINAR DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 269
Perspectives on Countervailing Duties
by
John H. Jackson
Published in Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1990.
THEsUMNR AND LAURA
F0 ER LIBRARY
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

"
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INTRODUCTION
The article by Professor Richard Diamond entitled "A Search for Eco-
nomic and Financial Principles in the Administration of U.S. Counter-
vailing Duty Law," is an intriguing presentation of certain economic
principles applied to an area of international and national law that des-
perately needs such analysis. The subsidy rules of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system could substantially undermine the
post-World War II Bretton Woods System as it applies to trade, unless
these rules are refined and disciplined by current or future international
trade negotiations. An expansive interpretation of subsidy and counter-
vailing duty rules could result in the application of countervailing duties
to almost any imported product. If this were to occur, the forty-year effort
to liberalize border trade barriers could be largely nullified.
Thus far, the United States is the most extensive user of countervailing
duties. Few other governments have applied countervailing duties, and
have done so only in rare cases. Nevertheless, there is a fear that these
other governments may follow the lead of the United States. In fact, it is
thought, they may utilize principles of United States law and thereby not
only disrupt trade, but disrupt exports from the United States. As a result,
an attempt to develop a more rational international discipline for the use
of countervailing duties, and for subsidized trade, became a priority item
at the September 1986 GATT Ministerial meeting held at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, which launched the GATT Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations.
The article by Professor Diamond is one of relatively few attempts to
rigorously apply the principles of economics to the law of countervailing
duties and subsidies and thus is a substantial contribution to the literature.
It is my role to comment on that article, with some emphasis on GATT
and the Uruguay Round.
This comment primarily reflects its author's reactions to the principal
article. However, to some extent it also addresses a 1989 work by the
principal author,' and a paper by Goetz, Granet and Schwartz2, to which
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Professor Diamond's 1989 paper replies. While this comment will raise
some fundamental objections to the central thesis of the article, it also
demonstrates an admiration for the analysis undertaken. That analysis,
perhaps modified, can substantially contribute to the national and interna-
tional debate on this subject.
The first issue this comment will discuss is the reasons underlying or
justifying a nation's response to subsidized imports. It is important to ex-
plore that issue because, at least in theory, one possible response would be
to do nothing except, as some economists have said, "send a thank you
note."3 In exploring why there should be a response to subsidized imports,
we can begin to appreciate what some of the policy goals of the response
system could be. These goals would shape the economic and other rules
for disciplining that system.
A second problem that must be explored further, is whether or not the
analysis of the author is "administrable." Although commendable in theo-
retical terms, the analysis may require a level of expertise and immunity
from political or bureaucratic forces that is unattainable in the real world.
The principal author's approach appears to require sophisticated eco-
nomic analysis, and provides few of the clear, bright lines and categories
that make a system administrable. On the other hand, the analysis might
well provide a basis for evaluating certain bright lines, existing or pro-
posed. This would be a considerable contribution.
In discussing this last point, this comment will briefly survey the cur-
rent GATT system and suggest ways in which the principal author's
analysis fits into the system. (As used in this comment, the phrase
"GATT system" refers not only to the international treaties, including the
GATT and the 1979 Subsidies Code of the Tokyo Round, but also to
national legal systems that apply to subsidized imports, namely the coun-
tervailing duty laws of national systems.) The attached Appendix lists a
number of practices that have been, or could be considered, subsidies.
These demonstrate some of the conceptual problems of administering the
current GATT system. Finally, this paper outlines several specific princi-
ples relating to the countervailing duty subsidy system, and discusses those
in the light of the principal article and the previous parts of this comment.
2. Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, The Meaning of 'Subsidy' and 'Injury' in the Countervailing
Duty Law, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 17 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Sykes, Second-Best Countervailing Duty Policy: A Critique of the Entitlement Ap-
proach, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 699 (1990); Trebilcock, Is the Game Worth the Candle? 21
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 723 (1990).
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THE POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE GATT SYSTEM CONCERNING
SUBSIDIZED PRODUCTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Professor Diamond refers to tension between a distortion deterrent
model and an entitlement model.' Application of the entitlement model
would lead to the use of countervailing duties to neutralize the effects in
the importing market of the subsidies in the exporting market-an elabo-
rate fine tuning. This author does not agree, however, that the entitlement
model is necessarily the best one, or for that matter that it is always neces-
sary to choose between models. In fact, the international community ap-
pears to have adopted the rationale that primarily supports a deterrent to
distortion,& even though specific treaty language may be ambiguous in that
regard. Experiences in the agricultural sector strongly suggest to govern-
ments the need to deter and inhibit the use of subsidies that affect interna-
tional trade.'
Furthermore, a focus solely on Congressional intent behind the U.S.
statutes is only partially adequate or revealing. Both the legislative history
and the statutory language are often ambiguous. On the one hand, the
reasonably clear legislative history for the 1979 Trade Agreements Act,
(which established the current countervailing duty statute) indicates that
Congress intended the Act to satisfy U.S. obligations arising from the To-
kyo Round agreements.' On the other hand, references to the earlier
countervailing duty statute and definitions could lead to contrary implica-
tions, particularly if one believes that the earlier statute was merely
protectionist.
4. See Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of
U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507 (1990).
5. The 1979 Subsidies Code includes language "[r/ecognizing also that subsidies may have
harmful effects on trade and production .... " Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Arti-
cles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, 31
U.S.T. 513, 518, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 1, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204, 204 [hereinafter GATT Subsidies
Code). See also Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1447, 1448-49
(1979); Baldwin, Nontariff Distortions of International Trade, in 1 UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD: COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS 641, 646-47
(1971); H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1979).
6. See Winglee, Agricultural Trade Policies of Industrial Countries, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1989,
at 9; The True Costs of Farm Support: Canada's Shame, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 1990, at 67; USDA
Undersecretary: Export Bonus a Success, J. COM., Aug. 1, 1989, at 7A; Boaden, Abolish Farm
Export Subsidy, J. CoM., July 20, 1989, at 8A.
7. 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982).
8. See J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NA-
TIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 167 (1984) [hereinafter IMPLE-.
MENTING THE ToKYo ROUNDl.
Fundamentally, however, it is necessary to ask, before endorsing an en-
titlement model, why should there be any entitlement? What gives-a U.S.
industry sector the right to demand that its government offset or neutralize
the effects of foreign subsidies on its business? Professor Diamond's an-
swer refers generally to unfair actions, but does not explain why subsidies
are unfair.
This author has previously considered the question of the policy under-
pinnings of countervailing duties and international subsidies rules.9 What
follows is a brief review of part of that discussion, starting with the ques-
tion of why the GATT system should provide for any sort of response to
the international trade of subsidized products.
Many have argued that subsidized imports represent a benefit to the
importing country, which substantially exceeds the potential detriments
(on a welfare. basis), and thus that the best response would be a "thank
you note sent to the subsidizing government that exported the goods.
Further, it has been argued that levying a countervailing duty in response
to such a subsidy would have the same welfare damaging effects as any
tariff. These arguments, however, seem inadequate. Since economists
demonstrate persuasively that subsidies can have a considerable distorting
effect, it seems clear from a global perspective that many subsidies in in-
ternational trade reduce overall world welfare.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the principal welfare reduc-
tion occurs in the economy of the subsidizing government, and that, there-
fore, no retaliatory or recompensating response need be levied by the im-
porting countries. This argument also is inadequate. There are a number
of market and political factors which illustrate why governments may
choose to respond. The unfettered use of subsidies in international trade
can lead to counter-subsidies, and counter-counter-subsidies in an escalat-
ing progression, all of which can seriously damage world welfare. This
has already been demonstrated in the agricultural sector. In some cases,
the countries whose welfare is damaged can ill afford the costs. Thus, it
can be argued there is a reason for the international system to intervene
and in some way try to inhibit the use of subsidies generally. Game theo-
rists, such as Robert Axelrod, would suggest that a "tit for tat" policy of
countermeasures can have desirable effects in circumstances such as
these.10
9. J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL EcO-
NOMIC RELATIONS (1989).
10. See R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTIoN OF COOPERATION 27 (1984),
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The GATT. system provides two approaches for disciplining subsidies
in international trade. The first, embodied in GATT Article VI" and in
Track I of the 1979 Code,'2 is to permit countervailing duties by national
governments. The second, contained in GATT Article XVI"3 and in
Track II of the Code,"' is to provide substantive international law rules
that prohibit certain kinds of government subsidies. Perhaps in a perfect
world, only the second of these measures would be used, and counter-
vailing duties would never be permitted because they can substantially
distort the welfare in the importing country. International rules, however,
often do not work satisfactorily.
Thus, an argument can be made for a fall-back or second best approach
which would allow governments to utilize countervailing duties, in the
general hope that the use of such countervailing duties will in the long
run tend to discourage the use of subsidies, or at least those that affect
internationally traded goods. This approach can be countenanced even
though the motives of governments in applying countervailing duties are
really not to maximize world welfare, but are instead to maximize the
welfare of the producers who constitute important political constituencies
within the country. Nevertheless, if the use of countervailing duties also
has a beneficial effect on world welfare, then arguably such countervailing
duties should be permitted.
This conclusion, of course, avoids the empirical question concerning
whether or not countervailing duties do in fact tend to discourage the use
of subsidies. A cursory study, primarily based on anecdotal evidence and
some direct observations and discussions with officials, suggests that the
use of countervailing duties by the United States has had some effect in
discouraging the use of subsidies. Indeed, at the conference at which the
articles contained in this publication were presented, private and govern-
ment practitioners noted the decreasing frequency of complaints about for-
eign subsidies. Perhaps U.S. countervailing duty actions have already had
some impact.'0
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 61
Stat. A3, A23, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 212 [hereinafter GATT].
12. GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 5, 31 U.S.T. at 523, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 6, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 212.
13. GATT, supra note 11, art. XVI, 61 Stat. at A51, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250.
14. GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 5, 31 U.S.T. at 530, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 13, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 220.
15. The author has had personal discussions with foreign government officials who are planning
to change their government subsidy programs due to pressures from exposure to U.S. countervailing
duty actions.
It is important to note, however, that only large countries are able to
use countervailing duties to create such an impact. Small countries will
generally be unable to use countervailing duties to change foreign govern-
mental activity. Thus, there is an important asymmetry in the use of
countervailing duties by the United States or other large countries. This
may explain part of Canada's frustration with the GATT subsidies
system.
There are several other policy arguments which support some sort of a
GATT system response to subsidization.'8 A brief summary of these
follows.
First, it has been argued that short term subsidies could have an "in
and out adjustment cost," which could total more than the welfare benefit
received from the subsidy. This is not likely. In addition, most subsidies
tend to be much longer in duration (despite fiscal incentives of govern-
ments to get rid of them), so it would be unwise to rely too heavily on this
argument.
A second argument is based on an analogy from antidumping law,
namely "the risk of predation." Unlike antidumping law, where the pre-
dation argument would be based on the action of firms (dumping goods to
achieve market share, and then capturing new monopoly rents), subsidy
cases generally involve government action. It seems anomalous to argue
that governments would engage in predatory trading activity with a view
to capturing future monopoly rents.
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that governments so moti-
vated are-much more likely to succeed than individual firms, which would
have difficulty policing a coalition of firms attempting to have such an
impact. The governments are generally larger, and can influence more
firms, and thus could predate. A government might want to predate for
purposes of what is now commonly called targeting. That is, a govern-
ment may want to encourage a certain industry sector to obtain a global
market share so as to allow that sector in the future to obtain monopoly
rents and thus increase the welfare of that government's society.
Again, whether or not this actually occurs is an empirical question that
has been little studied. Furthermore, the declining cost curve, or "learning
curve efficiency arguments," must be considered. If government subsidiza-
tion merely enables industries to more quickly gain the economies of scale
that allow them to continue to produce at considerably lower prices (and
not necessarily to capture monopoly rents), perhaps the whole world bene-
fits from such targeting.
16. IMPLEMENTtNG THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 8, Chapter 11.
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Finally, it has been argued that governments and societies should be
able to choose their own economic systems, without undue interference
from foreign countries. Subsidies on goods exported to other countries to
some extent interfere with the importing society's choice of an economic
system. Such subsidies add a layer of risk to entrepreneurial decisions in
the importing society and create a sense of unfairness at having to compete
with foreign finance ministries. In some cases, such subsidies could lead to
political pressure directed towards causing the government in the import-
ing country to institute counter-subsidies.
This argument probably best supports the entitlement approach offered
by Professor Diamond. However, this argument can be seen as a rational-
ization on the basis of a purely protectionist impulse-urging a govern-
ment to reduce competition for domestic producers so that they will bene-
fit at the expense of domestic consumers and of producers abroad who do
not vote.
There is an additional policy that should be mentioned, which lurks
behind all discussions of unfair trade practices in international trade."?
This is the concept of interface, which suggests that even relatively minor
differences between economic systems can, at certain times in the business
cycle, cause uneven distress between trading partners. This distress can
have a considerable political impact when specific groups in an importing
country feel that their distress is due to unfair burden-sharing in the
world trading system.
There are certainly policy grounds for arguing that a mechanism, pre-
sumably an international interface mechanism, should help ameliorate
these political forces. To some extent, this argument suggests that a safe-
guard policy underlies or should underlie what has traditionally been ana-
lyzed as an unfair trade matter. In other words, it suggests that the unfair
trade laws, including countervailing duty laws, may be substituted for in-
adequate safeguards, institutions and policies, which have very little to do
with a lack of fairness.
Having discussed the policy underpinnings of countervailing duty law,
this comment now relates these policies to Professor Diamond's discussion
in the principal article. If the policies outlined above constitute a plausible
basis for the GATT system response to subsidies, it would seem to follow
that the entitlement model is not fully supported. The policies outlined, it
seems, tend to support the distortion model, and possibly a predation pre-
vention model, and this latter model is related to targeting policies. Quite
probably the policies are mixed-there are certain elements of all of the
17. See id. Chapter 10 (discussing the interface principle in relation to antidumping duties).
above policies reflected in the actual rules applied, or in the desires of
negotiators to change those rules.
An important criticism of the distortion model made in the principal
article is that the model fails to take into account externalities. This is a
valuable contribution of the article. It does not follow from this, however,
that the distortion model should be abandoned and the entitlement model
preferred. Another approach would be to amend the distortion model to
include measures designed to cope with externality problems-that is, to
better tune the distortion model.
THE GATT SYSTEM FOR SUBSIDY/COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS
The GATT system, as it pertains to the subject matter of this comment,
may be easily described in three parts. First, the GATT; second, the 1979
Subsidies Code from the Tokyo Round; and third, the current Uruguay
Round Negotiations.
For at least one hundred years, international trade policy makers have
felt that at least certain kinds of subsidies were inappropriate and unfair.
As noted above, the international system has responded with two different
mechanisms for dealing with such situations: 1) permitting national gov-
ernments to offset the subsidy element in imported goods by using coun-
tervailing duties; and 2) providing international rules concerning the use
of subsidies in international trade.
. The original GATT Treaty document of 1947 contains both ap-
proaches."8 Article VI of the GATT permitted the use of countervailing
duties in the case of subsidized imports that caused material injury to the
competing domestic industry. Article XVI in the original GATT con-
tained a soft reporting requirement along with some admonitions concern-
ing the use of subsidies in international trade. Basically, however, the
original GATT had very little international rule discipline on the use of
subsidies.
It was only in the 1955 amendment to GATT Article XVI, that the
first substantive international obligation against the use of certain kinds of
subsidies (export subsidies) was included in the GATT. Even then, as
stated in the Article XVI amendments, the discipline was very meager.
First, for technical, treaty-amending reasons, it only applied to the indus-
trial countries which were signatories to the GATT, and not to the devel-
oping countries.1 Second, its obligation related only to export subsidies.
18. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL. ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS 727-28 (1986).
19. IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 8, at 256.
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Even in that case, certain technical clauses undercut the rigor of the obli-
gation, particularly as to primary products.
0
Thus, by, the time of the Tokyo Round in 1973-1979, there was a
strong desire, spearheaded by the U.S. government, to develop additional
international rules to discipline the use of subsidies in international trade.
This became a major priority for the Tokyo Round negotiation. The re-
sulting 1979 Code follows the GATT two track system. It further regu-
lates the use of countervailing duties, although it does not provide a defi-
nition of "subsidy." In the second track, it lays down more stringent
international rules which prohibited the use of export subsidies on non-
primary goods.31
The second track has a number of provisions useful for defining sub-
sidy, including the important annex regarding export subsidies. However,
some signatory countries believe that the definition of "subsidy" for Track
II purposes, does not necessarily apply to Track I. Operating on that as-
sumption, national governments applying countervailing duties have con-
siderable discretionary scope for defining "subsidy"-a risk for interna-
tional trade policy.
An important new development in Track II of the GATT 1979 Code is
the provision of international rules on so-called "domestic subsidies." Ar-
ticle 11 of the Code discusses these. It notes that some subsidies are appro-
priate.governmental measures, but that they can have damaging impacts
on importing countries. Signatories are obligated to seek to avoid causing
such effects through the use of subsidies."3
Track I of the Code (concerning countervailing duties) does not have
elaborate provisions concerning the calculation of the subsidy, or appro-
priate amounts of countervailing duties. Article 4 of the Code does limit
countervailing duties to the "amount of the subsidy found to exist, calcu-
lated in terms of subsidization per unit."
3" In addition, Article 4 states
that "it is desirable that the imposition be permissive,"
4 and "that the
duty be less than the total amount of the subsidy if such lesser duty would
be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.""1 This lesser
duty rule is not binding and U.S. law prevents its use in U.S. counter-
vailing duty law.
20. See Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 5, at 1461.
21. GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 5, 31 U.S.T. at 531, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 14, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 222.
22. Id. 31 U.S.T. at 530, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 13, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 224.
23. Id. 31 U.S.T. at 523, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 6, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 212.
24. Id.-
25. Id.
Additional language in Article 4 (of Track I) of the Code provides that
material injury must be found "through the effects of the subsidy."26 This
causal relationship has been the subject of some controversy in GATT
unfair trade negotiations for several decades, but no resolution has been
reached. Professor Diamond's analysis might very well provide a means to
flesh out the causal relationships required in the Code.
When the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was launched at
Punta del Este in September 1986, the negotiators felt that a priority sub-
ject for the new negotiation was revision of the subsidies rules. This is
partly because many of the rules contained in the 1979 Code are ambigu-
ous. The ambiguities that exist are in part attributable to a lack of sub-
stantive agreement among the negotiators in the Tokyo Round. One of
fourteen of the Uruguay Round negotiating groups on trade in products
(a fifteenth concerns trade in services) is devoted to revision of the subsi-
dies rules.
One idea this negotiating group is considering is the so-called "three
basket," or "red-green-yellow light" approach. This approach was ini-
tially suggested during the Tokyo Round, but was blocked by some of the
negotiating partners so that it did not become the basis for the 1979 Code.
One basic idea of this approach is to try to specify, directly in the treaty,
exactly which types of subsidies can result in countervailing duties, and
which cannot.
A "green light" basket would list a series of subsidy practices which
would always be permitted, and should not be grounds for countervailing
duties. An example might include broad societal infrastructure activities,
such as the building of schools and roads or the provisions of fire and
police protection. A "red light" basket might include a list of subsidy
practices that would either be forbidden under international law, and/or
always subject to countervailing duties, perhaps even without the require-
ment of an injury test. Some suggest that export subsidies would fall into
this category. In the field of antitrust law, the analogous provision would
be a list of practices that would, as a per se rule, occasion antitrust
liability.
The middle basket, the "yellow light" basket, would consist of all other
subsidy practices. Here, the injury test would be important. Counter-
vailing duties would be allowed in the cases where these types of subsidies
occurred, provided that they were causally related to the material injury of
the competing industry in the importing country. As of this writing, it is
not clear how much the negotiations will be able to achieve.
26. Id. 31 U.S.T. at 524, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 7, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 212.
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Professor Diamond's analysis provided in the principal article could be
exceedingly useful in helping negotiators determine into which category
certain subsidy practices would fall. On the other hand, it must be recog-
nized that the results of the negotiations need to be administrable, with a
minimum of administrative costs. Thus, the categories cannot be too finely
tuned, or administration may become too difficult. The economic analysis
of the principal article could be used to ascertain when certain broad cate-
gories of subsidies have, because of their effect on the marginal cost of the
subsidy recipient, a causal relationship to material injury in the importing
market. In addition, as discussed below, this analysis could reinforce the
idea that unless a subsidy has some effect outside the subsidizing country,
the GATT system should not allow countermeasures.
One way to test the analysis of the principal article is to determine how
it might apply to different types of subsidies. Appendix A lists hypotheti-
cal subsidy situations useful for the purpose of testing some of the
analysis.
COMMENTS ON SEVERAL SELECTED PROBLEMS AND APPLICATIONS
This comment will now address certain selected problems in applying
countervailing duties. It will discuss Professor Diamond's approach in
connection with these problems and in light of the principles outlined in
the previous sections of this comment.
In international discussion, some nations have advocated a "cost to the
government" approach rather than a "benefit to the recipient" approach
in determining the existence of a subsidy. The Subsidy Code Annex is
cited to argue that the cost approach is required by the international rules.
However, if the model is largely a distortion model, then clearly the bene-
fit to the recipient is the preferred approach. Assume a government pays
eight percent for its borrowing. When it then lends at ten percent and the
market charges twelve percent, a benefit has been received that distorts in
the sense that it sends the wrong effiency oriented signals. In one sense,
there is no cost to the government. However, if one presumes an opportu-
nity cost approach, one can conclude otherwise. The principal article uses
the term "cost" to describe the effect of the benefit received on the margi-
nal cost of the firm. This seems to be consistent with the benefit approach
of the terminology used in the international discussions.
General Approaches and Administrability
If the essential policy underlying countervailing duties is not confined to
an entitlement theory, then the application of countervailing duties would
differ from the rather fine-tuned neutralization goals of the principal arti-
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cle. For example, if deterring subsidies is the (or one of the) primary
goals, then the system might not be so hesitant to apply countervailing
duties that were larger than necessary to neutralize the impact of the sub-
sidy. The same might be true of a safeguards policy.
On the other hand, if the primary or only goal is preventing predation
or targeting, then a substantially different approach would be necessary.
At least at the injury phase, attention would have to be given to many
factors not later involved in countervailing actions, such as the structure of
competition, intent, and, the likelihood of future price increases to capture
monopoly rents. Unfortunately the reality of the situation is likely to be
one of mixed goals. Even if the GATT system does not wish to heavily
sanction the use of subsidies, it may desire some sanctioning element,
while focusing generally on neutralizing.
Even focusing on neutralization under an entitlement theory, it is inter-
esting to consider whether or not the result in most cases would be much
different than the current practice in the United States. Quite clearly, cer-
tain cases would be different-indeed in some cases, the, principal article
seems to suggest that no countervailing duty should result, whereas the
current practice requires them. But in a number of other cases, the work-
ing through of the difficult economics to ascertain the marginal cost effect
might result in relatively minor differences in duties. Thus, the greatest
utility of Professor Diamond's analysis might be in its attempts to define
certain categories of cases that should be dismissed at the outset (for ex-
ample, those which should incur zero countervailing duties). Certain re-
gional aids may be the prime candidates. The participants at the confer-
ence at which the articles in this publication were presented entertained a
wide variety of opinions on the administrative feasibility of the proposal.
The Lesser Duty Rule
The Subsidies Code recommends but does not require the "lesser duty
rule." The Europeans use this rule in administering their anti-dumping
actions, and also in countervailing duty cases to the extent that they have
had them. Their approach is to apply a duty that somehow is deemed to
eliminate the injury. Professor Diamond's analysis would seem to confirm
this approach, but it may not be identical to it. In fact, the lesser duty rule
as used by the European Economic Community (EEC) may actually re-
sult in still smaller duties than the neutralization goal of the principal
analysis. Such a case might occur if, for example, a government decided to
apply a countervailing duty that offset part of the subsidy but did not
fully neutralize the subsidy's effect. If the importing market sector would
make very large (unconscionable?) profits, but for the competition of sub-
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sidized imports, that government might decide to offset only part of the
harm of the imports, having in mind that down-stream industries (one
form of consumer) will be harmed by the countervailing duties.
Effect Across A Border
This author previously argued for a requirement in countervailing duty
law that a subsidy be shown analytically to have some cross-border ef-
fect," a principle which in one sense parallels Professor Diamond's analy-
sis. Where such a showing is not made, the international community has
little reason to take cognizance of the subsidy; it should not be actionable
under my terminology. This is because if a sovereign nation for its own
good reasons (for example, income redistribution, assistance to minorities,
or promoting religion) wishes to take an action that lowers its own wel-
fare, but does not affect other societies, that should be within the discre-
tion of that nation's government. The regional aids case provides an im-
portant example.
Consider the following illustration. Suppose Italy wants a certain glass
factory to be located in a depressed mountainous region. Suppose further
that a private enterprise would also choose to invest in such a factory, but
would locate it at a port. If the government granted a subsidy just suffi-
cient to offset the added costs of the unpreferred location, arguably the
only economy that suffers overall reduced welfare is Italy. It is unlikely
there will be any effect on the amount or price of exports. In such a case,
no countervailing duty should be applied by the foreign importing coun-
try. Under current U.S. law, however, the administration is required to
countervail (unfortunately, by rather explicit Congressional mandate.)"8
It can be argued that this type of issue should be handled at the injury
phase of the case-that a showing be made that no injury is caused by the
subsidy. But this assumes margins analysis* at the injury phase (which is
currently uncertain), and also in any event imposes expensive process
costs. Thus, it would be better to dismiss such cases at the outset, or per-
haps in the preliminary injury phase. Categories of cases could be identi-
fied and outlined, enabling administrators to easily dispose of some cases.
Professor Diamond's analysis seems to strongly support this approach,
phrasing it perhaps more eloquently. That analysis would presumably
show in such cases that no effect occurred on the marginal cost of the
firm,'and thus no countervailing duty should be imposed. However, the
27. See IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 8, at 265.
28. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1982) (defining "net subsidy").
29. "Margins analysis" refers to the argued need to link the injury not just to subsidized im-
ports, but also to the margin of the subsidy-.
analysis should focus on the marginal cost of the exports to the foreign
market. The principal article touches on this, but might elaborate more.30
Professor Diamond's hypothetical case of a government subsidy offered
to decommission a facility3" fits into this line of reasoning. In fact, if Pro-fessor Diamond's thesis, as applied, did nothing more than achieve the
result of avoiding countervailing duties in cases like these two hypotheti-
cals, this would be a substantial contribution.
Specificity
One of the most significant limiting principles of U.S. countervailing.duty law is the specificity or general availability test. This test has worked
reasonably well in providing administrators with a relatively adminis-
trable rule for eliminating some cases, particularly those troublesome cases
involving the general structure of society and its infrastructure, such as
roads, schools, fire and police. If countervailing duties are not to apply to
virtually every import, such a rule is very important. Unfortunately, the
international rules in the Subsidies Code do not clearly mandate this prin-
ciple, and a possible target for negotiators is to establish this rule in inter-
national law as well.
It is thus both interesting and important to explore how Professor Dia-
mond's analysis might treat cases in comparison to how they are treated
under the specificity test. In the alternative, one could explore how the
analysis treats the road and school cases. The author of the principal arti-cle has stated that his work assumes the specificity test and only applies to
cases of specific subsidies. However, his analysis could be used to help
justify the specificity test or to assist in determining in which cases it
would be appropriate to conclude that specificity did not exist.
Centrally Planned Economies
One of the most significant pending policy questions about counter-
vailing duty law is its application to non-market economies (NME), cen-
trally planned economies, or state trading countries. Currently, adminis-
trative decisions confirmed by appellate court decisions, have ruled that
U.S. countervailing duty law does not to apply to such economies. The
argument relied upon by the government is that it is usually impossible to
ascertain what is a subsidy in such economies. One cannot measure the
effect of government treatment in a market where no market exists.
30. See Diamond, supra note 4, at 537-39.
31. Id. at 542.
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The current law exempting non-market economies from countervailing
duty law is not likely to endure. The issue is certainly part of the negotia-
tion for China's entry into the GATT, and will also be so with respect to
the USSR's entry negotions. Various, proposals include an import bench-
mark price derived from market economy imports, which will serve to flag
NME imports which are priced too low.
Professor Diamond's analysis apparently does not address this case.
The paper discusses the cases, but only to glean evidence that the govern-
ment does not employ the distortion model as a policy. The principal
analysis seems to depend on the existence of the market contrafactual to
measure the subsidy that is the start of the analysis. It is speculative, at
this point, whether the surrogate country technique is to be used, as it is
in dumping cases, to construct a fictional market as the contrafactual in
the NME cases.
Net Subsidy Idea
There has been some international discussion both in the GATT and in
the context of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, concerning the net
subsidy idea. Under this idea, a countervailing duty could be imposed on
imports only to the extent that the exporting country's subsidies exceed
the subsidies of the competing product by the importing country. Under
current application, the domestic industry has a tremendous advantage in
competing against imports, by using the benefit of subsidies (for example,
local tax forgiveness to locate a plant) to undersell imported prices. A
subsidy practice abroad will give rise to a countervailing duty on imports
into the United States even when the United States industry receives that
same subsidy in the United States. Thus it is argued that true neutraliza-
tion should be applied only to the difference between subsidies.
Once again, Professor Diamond's analysis does not seem to address this
issue, although he might be sympathetic to this approach. This depends
on how one defines and perceives the entitlement. If, for example, the
entitlement is considered truly a protectionist right, it could be hostile to
the net subsidy approach.
Export Subsidies
The international rules flatly prohibit export subsidies (as opposed to
general or domestic subsidies) on industrial goods, and there is widespread
consensus that export subsidies in particular are to be condemned and
deterred. The argument is that such subsidies clearly indicate that a na-
tion is attempting to distort trade or impose burdens (political and eco-
nomic) on foreign societies. It has been argued that, in addition to the
international prohibition, countervailing duties should be allowed in such
a case even without an injury test. At least one author has suggested that
duties in such cases should be required, not just allowed.32
Under Professor Diamond's analysis, in most cases, the marginal cost
affecting analysis would likely result in a countervailing duty, perhaps
nearly equal the subsidy amount. It is unclear, however, whether this
analysis would go so far as to support a per se rule in these cases.33
CONCLUSION
Professor Diamond's principal article offers some important insights
and a mode of analysis that can help advance knowledge about the appro-
priate international response to subsidies that affect international trade.
Nonetheless, it leaves many questions unanswered.
A policy analysis of this subject might more appropriately begin at a
different starting point-inquiring as to the rationale for any response
before considering what response is most effective. To this author, it seems
clear that the "thank you note" approach (no response) is justified only
with respect to the goal of national welfare, as opposed to world welfare.
World experience, especially with respect to agricultural products (with
the United States and the EEC in a virtual subsidy war) reinforces the
need for this broader perspective. In fact, even many "thank you note"
proponents recognize a need to address export subsidy problems, in con-
trast to domestic subsidies.
The argument in favor of countervailing duties, of course, is weakened
by such economic analyses as those presented in the Sykes3 and Trebil-
cocks3 papers, which show that countervailing duties have the welfare lim-
iting effects of any tariff. This leads some to emphasize a system of inter-
national rules as a way to control the world welfare damage of subsidies.
It is interesting to note, for example, that in the current trade negotiations
of the Uruguay Round, some proposals concerning services trade do not
suggest countervailing duties, but do provide for international rules to dis-
cipline subsidies. Indeed, in some instances the international rule may be
the only way to proceed. Such is the case when the goods are targeted to
so-called third markets-neither the market of the subsidizing country nor
the country complaining about subsidies.
32. Barcel6, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 779, 794 (1977).
33. See generally Diamond, supra note 4, at 554-56.
34. see Sykes, supra note 3.




Some feel, however, that a system of international rules is still a "sec-
ond best" solution. There is much skepticism that the international rules
can work adequately to achieve the discipline needed. Thus, counter-
vailing duties and the various methods for measuring and applying them
remain the primary subject of debate. Even though these duties may
themselves cause welfare harms, future empirical exploration may indicate
that they are effective, in the long term, in reducing the use of distorting
subsidies. Many persons engaged in the study of subsidies and counter-
vailing duties are of the opinion that such duties do influence governments
to limit subsidies. It must be recognized, however, that the opportunity to
make effective use of countervailing duties is not evenly spread among
nations-countervailing duties utilized by a small market will not have
much effect on large markets. Likewise, it must be recognized that pres-
sures for more extensive use of countervailing duties normally come from
competing producers in the importing country.
Nevertheless, as this author has stated elsewhere, if one believes that
the world would be better off if there were a general reduction of the use
by governments of subsidies relating to products that flow in international
trade, one could argue that the U.S. policies, motivated for entirely differ-
ent reasons, may fortuitously or coincidentally be having a salutary effect
on the world economy.8
If we reluctantly accept the usefulness of countervailing duties, and that
appears to be a political certainty, then the question of how to prevent the
abuse of such duties arises. That is the subject of Professor Diamond's
article. However, it is questionable whether the entitlement model is the
optimal basis upon which to build such an analysis. Doing so may only
facilitate the protectionist or competition-limiting goals of competing do-
mestic producers. Furthermore, the legislative history of the relevant stat-
utes only provides limited insight into this issue.
Despite all this, however, the analysis targeting the marginal cost ef-
fects of subsidies is a worthwhile contribution. While it does not ade-
quately contribute to several important subsidy policy questions (for ex-
ample, the specificity test, or the problem of non-market economies), it
may provide a very useful way to help contain or discipline the unwar-
ranted use of countervailing duties. It can help identify some large catego-
ries of subsidies for which countervailing duties would be inappropriate
(for example, certain regional aids or subsidies to assist down-sizing or
decommissioning), and could be used to analyze many of the subsidy-type
practices listed in Appendix A. Furthermore, this analysis is potentially
very useful in relation to the evolution of the injury test and its related
concept of cause.
It is this general policy analysis that hopefully will assist government
officials and negotiators in the Uruguay Round, and contribute to a better
understanding of the relevant issues. In the view of this author, this is
more important than the marginal differences in duty that most likely
would be calculated under the entitlement approach as compared with
certain existing practices.
36. IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 8, at 255.
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APPENDIX A
SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
For each of the following situations, consider:
(a) whether you would view the government practice as a "subsidy"; and,
(b) whether you feel such practice is "unfair" when it benefits exports, so
that an importing nation should impose an offsetting duty or other import
restraint?
1. Government makes outright grant to a firm to assist its production of
widgets.
2. Government makes outright grant to a firm for each widget it produces
and exports.
3. Government makes outright grant to a firm which produces 12 or 15
different product lines, one of which is designed for export.
4. Government loans money to a firm which produces widgets for domes-
tic and export sale, on the following terms:
- government cost of borrowing is 8%, and
- normal market cost of borrowing for comparable firm is 12%, and
- government loan in this case is at 10%.
5. Government purchases shares (makes equity contribution) of firm pro-
ducing widgets for domestic and export sale - purchase at market
price, established by existing market in the shares.
6. Same, as in 5, except no market exists in those shares, so an appraised
value is used:
- based on book value, and
- with no expectation of dividend for 10 or 20 years, and
- knowing firm has business difficulties, and difficulty getting capital.
7. Widget firm goes bankrupt, writes off most debt, continues in business
and produces widgets for domestic and export sale.
8. Government makes grants to widget firm for use in encouraging the
retirement or relocation of unneeded workers.
9. Government makes grants to workers who lose their jobs from widget
firm because of business contraction and improvement of machinery,
thus saving potential legal or moral obligations of the firm.
10. Government makes grants to workers to retrain for new work in a
different production; such workers (retrained) then are employed by
gadget firm which produces for domestic and export sale.
11. Government adds funds to normal unemployment compensation pro-
grams, making it politically easier for a widget firm to lay off or re-
tire workers.
12. Government builds a road (or port or rail facility) for exclusive use by
widget firm, to encourage it to stay in business at its location.
13. Government builds such road/port/rail/airport for use by general
public, knowing that heaviest use will be by the widget firm.
14. Government upgrades existing road/port/rail/airport facility for
greater use by general public, knowing the widget firm will benefit
the most.
15. Local government gives real estate and corporate income tax relief to
a firm for a 10 year period to induce it to locate in the locale; firm
produces widgets for domestic and export sale.
16. Government heavily supports local college/university programs in en-
gineering related to widgets; local widget firm produces for domestic
and export sale.
17. Government provides funds for special training of workers to be hired
by the widget firm.
18. Same, except training is done by local technical high school.
19. Government makes special law setting a limit on product liability re-
covery of consumers or buyers of widgets, where:
-widget firm produces only for export, or
-widget firm produces for domestic and export sale.
20. Government, to promote science and technology, revises its patent and
copyright laws (computer programs?) to better favor high tech
industries.
21. Government does the same as in 20, but limits it just for computer
chips.
22. Government relieves firms engaged in substantial export from some
obligations to install pollution cleaning devices.
23. Government relieves industry sectors deemed "export oriented" from
environmental control problems.
24. Government is generally lax as to environmental problems. (Brazil?)
25. Government has no minimum wage law (or workmen's compensation
law, or OSHA work place safety law, etc.).
26. Government makes grant (or gives other advantages) to firm condi-
tioned on its location in depressed area and grant can be shown to just
offset added costs of the location.
27. Government gives grant or advantage to firm conditioned on other
social policy action, such as hiring handicapped or minority workers.
28. Government subsidizes production of a basic resource or input com-
modity (such as coal), which is then sold to a firm (such as steel pro-
ducer) which produces for domestic and export sale.
- in one case, "downstream" firm purchases input for less than it
would otherwise, and
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39. In a particular society, retirement tends to be at an early age (such as
55) but benefits are not too handsome, so there is a large eager labor
pool of persons which desire part-time work (up to a certain specified
limit). Certain industries, (e.g. assembling certain computer compo-
nents, or entering textual data at a keyboard) have discovered ways to
take advantage of this type of part-time labor, which is paid much
less than for other workers. These industries export as well as pro-
duce for the domestic market.
40. The government provides a more favorable rate of exchange for for-
eign currency which is earned from exports, rather than from other
transactions.
41. Same, but black market rate is even more favorable for foreign cur-
rency no matter how earned.
42. In each case above, a competing nation finds some of its markets in
third countries taken from its firms by the exports mentioned above.
What should be its reaction?
43. Government has an anti-monopoly law, but is lax in applying it to a
particular industry sector which has many exports.
44. Government has an anti-monopoly law, but is lax in applying it
generally.
45. Government has no anti-monopoly law.
46. Government has an export tax generally, but exempts from that tax
the export of widgets.
47. Government has an export tax on unfinished logs but none on fin-
ished lumber. (Similarly for soybeans & soymeal, or coffee beans &
processed instant coffee).
48. Widget imports can be shown to have benefitted by foreign subsidies
to the extent of just under 0.5%, or 0.1%, or 0.05%. The legal proce-
dures of a countervailing duty case can be shown to cost the foreign
exporter about 10% of its gross returns from widget exports to the
countervailing country,
49. The World Bank has financed, at concessional interest rates, the de-
velopment of a widget plant in a developing country which now ex-
ports widgets.
50. A government has good fire and police protection in its society, and
thus insurance costs for the widget plant are exceptionally low.
51. In a floating exchange rate world, a government grants an income tax
advantage at the same level to all exports.
52. A government has an exceptionally fine school and university system,
and its industry benefits from a well-educated work-force.
53. Societal norms favor "worker tenure" and other paternalistic worker
benefits, which for some industries including the widget industry seem
- in another case, it can be shown that the buyer firm pays the same
for the input product as it otherwise would, (but the "upstream" pro-
ducer would go out of business without the government aid).
29. Government owns a natural resource (coal, oil, timber, copper) and
sells this resource to domestic firms at a price lower than the world
market price. These firms produce for domestic and export sales. The
government either refuses to sell the same resources to foreign firms,
or sells to them only at a higher price.
30. Government owns a natural resource, and forms a government owned
company to exploit the resource and use it for making widgets which
are then sold for domestic or export purposes.
31. Government owns a natural resource, and sells it to highest bidder
among domestic firms (only), which in turn use the resource to pro-
duce goods for domestic and export sale. The price these firms can
obtain on their markets is essentially the world market price for the
finished goods, and this essentially determines the amount the firms
can bid for the natural resource.
32. Government shapes its defense procurement contracts to enable a firm
to invest in the needed R&D to develop a product, which then has
spinoff products suitable for domestic and export sale. (computers?)
33. Government gives special income tax deductions and credits for firms
producing for export.
34. The tax benefits are for all widget firms, but only widget firms, and
this sector produces for both domestic and export sale.
35. The tax benefits are available to all firms, but are shaped as deprecia-
tion deductions on capital equipment, so effectively only capital-inten-
sive industries benefit.
36. The government owns most or all of the industry; prices are set by
bureaucrats (domestic or export prices). Prices on widgets are set low
for both domestic and export sale.
37. The government owns a few selected industries, but included is the
widget industry which produces for export and domestic sale, and
-the government widget industry has never paid a dividend to the
government since "nationalization." (The government compensated
original owners.)
-the government has continued to add capital to its wholly-owned
widget industry.
38. The government provides many housing, medical, and other social
benefits for workers in industry, and because of this firms find they
can pay less for labor input into the widgets they produce for domes-
tic and export sale.
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to greatly increase worker output and efficiency, reducing strikes and
resistance to change.
54. A government has a domestic sales tax of 4%, charged on sales of
goods to consumers. Goods can be exported without paying this tax
(usually in wholesale quantities). It is noticed that the importing
country can charge a sales tax there.
55. A government has a domestic VAT (value added tax), which taxes
goods at each level of finishing (at about 20%). When goods are ex-
ported, whatever VAT has been paid is refunded to the exporter.
Goods which are imported are levied a VAT (in addition to tariffs) at
the same rate.
56. A government rebates to producer-exporters 25% of the income tax
which has been paid by the exporting firm insofar as the income tax
can be attributed to that portion of the business devoted to production
of the goods which are exported.
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